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Boon: They Killed Her for Going out with Boys: Honor Killings in Turkey

NOTE
THEY KILLED HER FOR GOING OUT WITH BOYS:
HONOR KILLINGS IN TURKEY IN LIGHT OF
TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND LESSONS FOR IRAQ
I.

INTRODUCTION

"We killed herfor going out with boys. ,,
Sait Kina's thirteen year old daughter, Dilber Kina, "talked to boys
on the street" and repeatedly tried to run away from home. In June
2001, during what would become her final attempt to leave, she was
caught by her father in their Istanbul apartment. Using a kitchen knife
and an ax, he beat and stabbed his daughter "until she lay dead in the
blood-smeared bathroom of the.., apartment." 3 Kina then "commanded
one of his daughters-in-law to clean up the [blood]" and had his sons
discard the corpse.4 Upon his arrest, Kina told authorities that he had
"'fulfilled [his] duty."' 5 Kina's daughter-in-law said, of the killing: 'He
6
did it all for his dignity."'
"Your sister has done wrong. You have to kill her. "7
In a village in eastern Turkey, male family members held a meeting
concerning the behavior of their twenty-five year old female family
member. She, a Sunni Muslim, disobeyed her father by marrying a man
who was an Alevi Muslim. Her father spent four months teaching his

1. Molly Moore, In Turkey, 'Honor Killing' Follows Families to Cities: Women Are Victims
of Village
Tradition, WASH. POST, Aug.
8,
2001,
at A01, available at
http://www.library.cornell.edu/coIldev/mideast/dilberk.htm (quoting Sait Kina).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. (quoting Sait Kina).
6. Id. (quoting Birgul Kina).
7. Id. (quoting a Turkish father's direction to his sixteen-year-old son).
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sixteen year old son how to hunt and shoot before he ordered his son to
kill his own sister. The youth resisted, and was beaten. In fall 1999, he
finally succumbed to this pressure, went to his sister's home and shot her
in the back while she was doing housework.8 He was told by his father:
"'You are young. This is your task. You will only stay in prison a few
weeks.' 9 The boy served eleven months in prison.' °
An "honor killing" or "honor crime" is the murder of a girl or
woman by her family members due to their disapproval of her alleged
sexual misbehavior, which they perceive as defying societal gender
norms. Honor crimes in Turkey are most prevalent in the rural areas of
the east and southeast, but are not limited to those areas.' 2 They also
occur in Turkish cities such as Istanbul and Izmir, as well as in Turkish
immigrant communities outside of Turkey.' 3 A woman is killed in the
name of honor when she does something or is thought to have done
something that falls outside of her traditional social role in Turkish
society. 14 Women are especially targeted for interacting with men
5
outside of their family or for any perceived or actual sexual behavior.1
The conception of "honour" (honor) is rooted in a social system
that imposes a particular behavioral code on women and girls.' 6 A man's
"honour" consists of two main components: His reputation is determined
by his own actions in the community ("seref') and the chastity or virtue

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Dicle Kogacioglu, The Tradition Effect: Framing Honor Crimes in Turkey,
DIFFERENCES 118, 118 (2004).

15

12. While honor killings are thought to occur most in the southeast, there are no national or
regional statistics on the occurrence of honor crimes. Kogacioglu suggests that even if the killings
are more frequent in the southeast, other practices such as "limits imposed on women's rights to
travel or to receive education" are persistent throughout the country, even in more urban areas like
Istanbul. Id. at 129-30. Other forms of violence in the name of honor (for example, beatings rather
than outright killings) are prevalent throughout the country. Attributing these crimes only to the
southeast carries with it an ethnic implication, as the southeast is primarily inhabited by Kurds.
Kurdish guerilla forces have repeatedly conflicted with the Turkish military, and thus attributing

honor crimes primarily to an area inhabited by Kurds, contributes to a larger process of Kurdish
ethnic stigmatization. Id. at 130. "This enables other parts of the country to be imagined as

somehow immune to the problem." Id.
13. CARN BENNINGER-BUDEL & LUCINDA O'HANLON, WORLD ORGANISATION AGAINST
TORTURE (OMCT), VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN TURKEY: A REPORT TO THE COMMITrEE
AGAINST TORTURE, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: 10 REPORTS/YEAR 2003, at339, 350 (2004)
[hereinafter VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN].

14. Id.at350-51.
15. Id.at351.
16. Id. at 352.
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of the female members of his family ("namus").17 When a man's namus
is threatened, he is encouraged to act to defend it. If a man's namus is
lost because of sexual conduct on the part of his female family members,
he kills the female party to regain his honor.' 8 The killer is usually a
husband, a brother, an uncle, a father or a son of the woman who
allegedly sullied the family's honor. 19 The decision to murder is often
sanctioned by a group of family elders who decide to punish the woman
and then determine what form that punishment should take.20
Though honor crimes are often dismissed as being part of
"tradition," it should be clear that honor crimes are human rights abuses.
Not only do these crimes involve murder, but also "[t]he condoned
Crime
Honor
the
under
exists
that
violence
umbrella... includes... attempted murder, acid attacks, and female
infanticides.,, 2 1 Thus, a wide array of illicit, violent activity stems from
the practice of honor killing. Honor crimes stand in violation of a
number of international human rights, including: "the right to life and
security of the person; freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment; and the right to equality before the law and to equal
protection of the law."22
In order for Turkey to fulfill the Copenhagen Political Criteria
("Copenhagen Criteria"), 23 which is necessary for its accession to the
European Union ("EU"), this Note will argue that honor killings must be
eliminated in Turkey. Successfully attacking the problem of honor
killings in Turkey is in the interests of both the EU and the United
States. Were honor killings to be eliminated in Turkey and women's
rights improved more generally throughout the country, Turkey's
accession to the EU would provide an example of a "modem" Arab state
where women are treated equally under the law and in practice. This
example would serve the American interest in providing a concrete

17.

Id.

18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See Moore, supra note 1.
21. Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment Under Islamic and
JordanianCriminalLaws, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 251,254 (2004).
22. AMNESTY INT'L, IRAQ: DECADES OF SUFFERING 16 (2005) [hereinafter AMNESTY, IRAQ],
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE140012005?open&of-ENG-IRQ.
23. Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council in Copenhagen (June 21, 1993), at 1216 [hereinafter Copenhagen Council Criteria]; see also Erich Hochleitner, The Political Criteriaof
Copenhagen and Their Application to Turkey, 1-3 (Austrian Inst. for European Sec. Policy,
Working Paper, 2005).
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model for Iraq, where, following the U.S.-U.K. invasion, honor killings
and domestic violence continue to be pervasive social problems.24
In order to facilitate this change, the EU and the United States
should extensively fund women's rights organizations in Turkey that are
dedicated to fighting against the existence of honor killings. A
nationwide campaign against honor killings has been recently launched
in Turkey, 25 and EU-U.S. funding would help immensely with these
efforts. Educational outreach programming directed both at familiesespecially in the more rural areas where tribal rule still dominates-and
at local law enforcement authorities should be a crucial part of this fight.
Additionally, developing and implementing basic socioeconomic
programs as well as increasing the number of shelters or safe spaces for
potential victims to turn to, would also be effective ways of targeting the
problem of honor crimes. Such programming could be made possible
through a combined EU-U.S. funded effort.
Part II of this Note will provide a brief history of Turkey's relations
with the EU. This section will also discuss the basis for Turkey's
accession to the EU, including both the EU's interest in having Turkey
join as a member state and that which Turkey stands to gain by joining
the EU.
Part III of this Note will address the criteria for Turkey's accession,
focusing particularly on its compliance with women's equality and
human rights requirements. This section will consist of a discussion of
the Copenhagen Criteria and Accession Partnership guidelines and the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
Part IV of this Note will address reforms that Turkey has instituted
in order to comply with these criteria. This section will include the
perspectives of the European Commission ("EC"), Turkish authorities
and American authorities. It will address the changes to Turkey's Penal
Code that have been heralded as a major step in eliminating honor
killings and will also briefly discuss changes in Turkey's Civil Code and
Constitution that are relevant to expanding women's rights in Turkey.
Part V of this Note will then point out problems that persist in light
of the above changes and problems with the changes themselves,
specifically with the reforms to the Penal Code. This section will also
24. ActionLA & PeaceNoWar.net, Kurdish Women Action Against Honour Killing
("KWAHK"), Women in Iraq: Womens Rights Are in Danger, http://www.kwahk.org/
articles.asp?id=43.
25. Turkey: 2005 Progress Report, at 32, COM (2005) 561 final (Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter
2005 Report].
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discuss the defense of provocation and the idea of the defense of honor
as a mitigating consideration in American criminal law. It will further
address other factors that contribute to the overarching problem of honor
killings, including: judicial practice; the tendency of Westerners, the
international community and Turkish judges to attribute these killings to
"tradition;" the fact that there are no networks of institutions to aid
victims; and a brief discussion of the EU's gender mainstreaming
approach.
Part VI of this Note will propose that the EU extensively fund
grassroots efforts in Turkey that address a number of factors that
contribute to the persistence of honor crimes. This method, when
combined with legal reforms, will be more effective in addressing the
problem of honor killings than legal changes alone. This section will end
with a discussion of the situation from an American perspective,
suggesting that Turkey could serve as an invaluable model for Iraq. The
United States and the EU share an interest in making Iraq and Turkey,
respectively, models of a "modem" Arab state.

II. ACCESSION
A.

History of Turkey's Relations with the EU and Roots ofAccession

Turkey first applied for European Exchange Commission ("EEC")
membership in 1959.26 The EEC established an association between
Turkey and itself that would suffice until conditions for accession were
established. 27 Notwithstanding Turkey's military coup in 1960,28 the
EEC and Turkey formalized their association in 1963 with the Ankara
Agreement, which contained a membership perspective. 29 The key
aspect of the Ankara Agreement was the establishment of "three phases
of a Customs Union which would serve as an instrument to foster real

26. Observatory of European Foreign Policy, Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus, EUTurkish Relations Dossier, http://selene.uab.es/_cs-iuee/english/Obs/minvestigacion.html (last
visited Feb. 9, 2007) [hereinafter EU-Turkish Relations].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic Community and
Turkey, Sept. 12, 1963, 1963 J.O. (L 361) 1, 5 [hereinafter Ankara Agreement]; see also
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament:
Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, at 2,
COM (2004) 656 final (Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter EC Recommendation].
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integration between the EEC and Turkey." 30 Additionally, a Financial
Protocol3 and a Council of Association,32 a group that meets to discuss
the work of the association, were established. Due to numerous military
coups throughout 1971-1980, the EEC and Turkey did not normalize
relations until 1983, when a civil government was established in
Turkey. 33 Turkey's eligibility for membership, its recognition as a
European country, was affirmed in 1987, but further action was
postponed because the EU "was not able to accept any new member[s]
before concluding its internal market integration in 1992." '3 Although
1995 marked the formation of a customs union,3 5 it was not fully
implemented.36
Turkey's membership was deferred because of its failure to meet
the Copenhagen Criteria,37 and also due to hostility from countries such
as Sweden and influential non-governmental organizations that argued
that Turkey could not be a European country.38 National governments
and organizations espoused the position that because Turkey was a
Muslim nation, it was fundamentally incompatible with the rest of
Europe.39 Turkey was further characterized as having a "democratic
deficit," which inhibited efforts to view Turkey as European. 40 The
debate continues to this day.4 '
Despite this opposition, in December 1999, at the Helsinki Council,
the EU officially recognized Turkey's candidacy for accession.4 2 This
decision stemmed in large part from an improvement in Turkey's
relations with Greece and from the election of leftist parties in the
majority of EU states,43 rather than a significant improvement in the

30. EU-Turkish Relations, supra note 26; see also Representation of the European
Commission to Turkey, EU-Turkey: Historical Overview, http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/english/euturkey.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Historical Overview].
31. Ankara Agreement, supra note 29, at 23-24 (setting forth Protocol No. 2, Financial
Protocol); see also EU-Turkish Relations, supra note 26.
32. Ankara Agreement, tit. 1, art. 6, supra note 29, at 7.
33. EU-Turkish Relations, supra note 26.
34. Id.
35. EC Recommendation, supra note 29, at 2.
36. See EU-Turkish Relations, supra note 26.
37. Id.; see Copenhagen Council Criteria, supra note 23, at 12-16; infra Part III.A.
38. EU-Turkish Relations, supra note 26.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Roger Cohen, Why Turkey Matters, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 1, 2005, at 2
(discussing European opposition to the idea that Turkey is part of Europe).
42. EC Recommendation, supra note 29, at 2.
43. Greece's EU membership in 1981 served to block Turkey's accession efforts on a number
of occasions. See EU-Turkish Relations, supra note 26. Greece's objection to the EC's proposed
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treatment of Turkish women or an enunciated commitment to human
rights on Turkey's part." Following the approval of Turkey's accession
candidacy, economic integration between Turkey and the EU rapidly
expanded.45 Political integration, or human rights reforms, did not occur
at the same rate.46 Nevertheless, in 2002, the EC reported: "'[I]f the
European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a
recommendation from the [EC], decides that Turkey fulfills the
Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open accession negotiations
with Turkey without delay. ' ' , 7 In 2004, the EC reaffirmed its
commitment to begin negotiations 48 and on October 3, 2005,
negotiations with Turkey resumed.4 9
B. Interests in Accession
The EU has both an economic 5° and a more symbolic interest in
Turkey's membership. The EC has declared: "Turkey would be an
important model of a country with a majority Muslim population
adhering to such fundamental principles as liberty, democracy, respect
5
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law." ' The
EC is insistent that Turkey is and always has been a vital part of Europe:
For major periods of European history, Turkey has been an important
factor of European politics. Turkey is [a] member of all important
other European organisations and has since the Second World War

cooperation package, "Matutes Package," prohibited the Council from adopting it. Greece and
Turkey have historically been engaged in ongoing disputes over Cyprus, as well as aerial and
maritime space and the continental shelf. Id. The rise of the Simitis government in Greece as well as
the solidarity resulting from earthquakes in 1999 decreased Greek opposition to Turkish accession
and contributed to the EU's acceptance of the Turkish candidacy at the Helinski Council of
December 1999. Id.
44. See id.
45. See id. (explaining how in 1999, Turkey became both a primary export destination of and
an exporter to the EU).
46. Id.
47. EC Recommendation, supra note 29, at 2 (quoting conclusions of the Copenhagen
European Council).
48. Id.
49. 2005 Report, supranote 25, at 4.
50. See Sfibidey Togan, Economic Implications of EU Accession for Turkey, in TURKEY:
ECONOMIC REFORM & ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 311, 311 (Bernard Hoekman &

Sflbidey Togan eds.,

2005) (discussing Turkish economics); see also STATE PLANNING

ORGANISATION, T.R. PRIME MINISTRY, THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF TURKEY'S MEMBERSHIP UPON

THE EU 24-40 (2004), available at http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/uyelikletki/olasi-i.pdf"
51. EC Recommendation, supra note 29, at 4.
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played an
52 important role in contributing to the shaping of European
policies.
The EU's "geo-strategic" position has been echoed in recent
comments by Tony Blair.53 Turkey can serve as a bridge between the
Middle East and the West, which is especially needed in light of recent
terrorist attacks.54 Jonathan Eyal, a political analyst from London's
Royal United Services Institute observed: "'For Blair this is a seminal
test,... He believes the only way to manage the Middle East is to show
that Europe stands ready to embrace the most westernized and modern
of Muslim states.' ' 55 The British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, made a
similar statement: "'Anchor Turkey in the West and we gain a beacon of
democracy and modernity, a country with a Muslim majority which will
56
be a shining example across the whole of its neighboring region."
This position has also been adopted by the United States.57 On a trip
to Istanbul in June 2004, President Bush spoke at length about the
example that Turkey could provide for the entire Middle East, especially
for Iraq.58 Bush also stressed the United States's enthusiastic support for
Turkey's entry into the EU. 59 The President told his Turkish audience:
Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands
as a model to others, and as Europes [sic] bridge to the wider world.
Your success is vital to a future of progress and peace in Europe and in
the broader Middle East-and the Republic of60Turkey can depend on
the support and friendship of the United States.
Thus, while European powers such as Germany are less enthusiastic
about Turkey's membership, 61 the measure has the staunch support of

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 2.
Cohen, supra note 41.
Id.
Id.(quoting Jonathan Eyal).
Id. (quoting Jack Straw).

57.

Id.

58. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Istanbul, Turkey (June 29, 2004)
[hereinafter
Bush,
Remarks],
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2004/06/20040629-4.html.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61.

See Cohen, supra note 41 (discussing German now-chancellor Angela Merkel's recent

expression of the opinion that Turkish membership is an "overstretch" and that a Turkish status of
"privileged partnership" rather than full membership would be preferable).
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the United States and Great Britain. There can be no doubt that the West,
as a whole, has a significant interest in Turkey's EU accession.62
Turkey, itself, also has a significant interest in becoming a member
of the EU.63 Many of the benefits of membership are economic.64
However, Turkey has a more symbolic interest in membership as well.
Turkey is officially committed to entrance into the EU because it
signifies that Turkey is committed to EU values and is a truly modem
state. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's website reports:
"The Turkish Government regards EU membership as a new step
forward, a milestone confirming the founding philosophy of and
Atatiirk's vision for the Republic. For the Turkish nation, conforming to
contemporary values is a way of life and an ideal to be pursued. 65 Thus,
the official position of the Turkish government is that Turkey shares the
western interest in becoming a "beacon" of modernity. As Turkey's
Minister of Foreign Affairs told EU ambassadors in November 2005,
"both Turkey and the EU stand to gain tremendously from our
integration process and from its finalization when Turkey becomes a
member .... The European public wants the EU to be a truly global
66
actor. Turkey's accession to the EU will be an asset in this respect.,
Thus, key Turkish political actors clearly see accession as being
mutually advantageous for both Turkey and the EU.
III.

THE ACCESSION CRITERIA AND TURKEY'S COMPLIANCE EFFORTS

A.

Criteriafor Accession

Before this vision can be accomplished, Turkey has had to and is
still in the process of instituting a variety of reforms. In order to be a
member of the EU, Turkey must comply with the entire body of EU
acquis
called the
collectively
standards,
and
legislation

62. See id. (discussing the interests of Europe and the United States in accession); see also
Bush, Remarks, supra note 58 (discussing the American interest in accession).
63. See Abdullah GI, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey,
Speech delivered at the Luncheon held with EU Ambassadors (Nov. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/Pressnformation/Speeches/Speeches2O05/Speech_9November
2005.htm(discussing Turkey's desire to join the EU).
64. See Harry Flam, Economic Effects of Turkey's Membership on the European Union, in
TURKEY: ECONOMIC REFORM & ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 50, at 341,351.

65. Basin-Yayin ve Enformasyon Genel Mdorligil [Directorate General of Press and
Information], EU National Programme, http://www.byegm.gov.tr/on-sayfa/ab/eu-np.htm (last
visited Feb. 9, 2007) [hereinafter National Programme] (unofficial translation).
66. Gil, supranote 63.
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communautaire.67 The EC declared that Turkey should prepare a
national program for adoption of these standards,68 including a timetable
for achieving the priorities and objectives established in the Accession
Partnership. 69
"The first Accession Partnership for Turkey was decided in March
2001" and later revised in 2003.70 The purpose of the Accession
Partnership is to give Turkey guidelines and financial assistance to
qualify for accession, stressing the areas in which Turkey needs to
improve. 7' This Note is primarily concerned with requirements regarding
human rights and equality between men and women.7 2
All candidate countries, including Turkey, must meet the
Copenhagen Criteria, established by the Copenhagen European
Council. 73 A nation's ability to meet these criteria establishes its position
among the ranks of countries marked by the "stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for
and protection of minorities., 74 Meeting these Criteria is a large step
towards EU membership.
Additionally, members of the EU are strongly encouraged to
comply with the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 7 which Turkey ratified in 1954.76
67. Togan, supra note 50, at 311.
68. See NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR ADOPTION OF THE ACQUIS, SUMMARY OF THE
NATIONAL PROGRAMME [hereinafter EU NATIONAL PROGRAMME], available at Embassy of the
Republic of Turkey, London, Turkey and the EU-Publications, http://www.turkish
embassylondon.org/EUDOCSINPAAexecutive summary.pdf.
69. Council Decision 2003/398, On the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives and
Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey, Annex, 2003 O.J. (L 145) 40, 42
(EC) [hereinafter Accession Partnership].
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, at I1, COM (2004) 656
final (Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Report]; see also Hochleitner, supra note 23, at 1.
74. Accession Partnership, supra note 69, at 42.
75. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. Although each of the current EU member states is also
a party to the ECHR, the Court of Justice of the European Community, the supreme EU court, has
held that the treaty establishing the European Community does not allow the Community to accede
to the ECHR. Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-01759. In light of this decision, the EC convened to draft
a charter embodying the notions embraced by the ECHR. Council Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union 2000/01, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 8 [hereinafter EU Charter]. While the EU has yet
to formally adopt uniform provisions reflecting the ECHR and its protocols, its rigid commitment to
their spirit was manifested in the short term priorities of Turkey's accession in Accession
Partnership, supra note 69, at 43.
76. European Court of Human Rights-Basic Texts, Dates of Ratification of ECHR,
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/ (follow "Basic Texts" hyperlink; then follow "Dates of ratification

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/17

10

Boon: They Killed Her for Going out with Boys: Honor Killings in Turkey
HONOR KILLINGS IN TURKEY

2006]

825

Relevant human rights requirements include
[a] Respect[ing] the judgments of the European Court of Human

Rights.

[b] Guarantee[ing] in law and in practice the full enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms by all individuals without
discrimination and irrespective of language, race, colour, sex,
political opinion, religion or belief in line with relevant
international and European instruments to which Turkey is a party.

[c] Strengthen[ing] the independence and efficiency of the judiciary
and promot[ing] consistent interpretation of legal provisions related
to human rights and fundamental freedoms in line with the
European Convention on Human Rights.
....[and]

[d] Extend[ing] the training of law enforcement officials on human
rights issues and modem investigation techniques, in particular as
regards the fight against torture
77 and ill-treatment, in order to
prevent human rights violations.
Turkey is also required to "[e]xtend the training of judges and
prosecutors on the application of the European Convention on Human
78
Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights."
Both of these provisions, as well as the proposed (but recently
rejected) European Constitution, 79 would require Turkey to adhere to

of the European Convention on Human Rights and Additional Protocols" hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 9, 2007).
77. Accession Partnership, supra note 69, at 43-44; see also ECHR, supra note 75, arts. 1, 23,42-46.
78. Accession Partnership, supra note 69, at 44.
79. Provisional Consolidated Version of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe (CIG) 86/04 of June 25, 2004, at I [hereinafter European Constitution] (proposing adoption
of the European Constitution with EU Charter, supra note 75, as one of its provisions). The EU
Charter recognizes a number of rights. These rights are categorically organized under the titles of
"Dignity," "Freedoms," "Equality," "Solidarity," "Citizens' Rights," and "Justice." EU Charter,
supra note 75, chps. I, II, III, IV, V, VI. The Charter recognizes such rights as the "right to the
integrity of the person... [with the] right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity,"
and the "[p]rohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment... [that] [n]o
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. arts. 3(1),
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basic tenets of human rights and would also prohibit discrimination on
the basis of sex in Turkey. g° When a woman, not her male lover, is
murdered by her male family members in order to purify the family's
honor, her fundamental human right to life has been violated. When, but
for the fact that her gender is female, she would not be the subject of
such an attack, she is being discriminated against because of her sex.
When society turns a blind eye, tacitly or explicitly condoning or
ignoring her male family members' actions, and neither the law nor her
community condemns the murder and punishes the murderer, her
fundamental human rights are being violated. When a woman is not free
to engage in sexual behavior outside of marriage without the threat of
violence from her male family members, this violates her fundamental
freedoms of dignity and equality in being able to express her sexuality
without gender-based victimization. The existence, and more
importantly, the tolerance of honor killings in Turkey is completely
incompatible with the Copenhagen Criteria and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and is indicative of gender discrimination.
B. Turkey's Efforts to Comply
Despite the prevalence of honor killings in Turkey and the
continued reports of violence against women and family violence, 8' the
EC and the United States have praised Turkey's efforts to generally
comply with the Copenhagen Criteria.82 As of 2003, the Copenhagen
European Council "strongly welcomes the important steps taken by
Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria., 83 The EC concluded
in 2004 that Turkey has recognized the primacy of international and
European law and aligned itself to a large extent with international
rulings and conventions.8 4 In its 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's
Progress Towards Accession, the EC stressed Turkey's new ratification
of international conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil

(4). In addition: "Equality before the law" specifies that "[e]veryone is equal before the law." Id. art.
20.
80. See id. art. 23 (requiring that "[e]quality between men and women must be ensured in all
areas").

81. 2005 Report, supra note 25, at 32 (discussing the persistence of violence against women
and honor crimes in Turkey).
82. See 2004 Report, supra note 73, at 54; see also Bush, Remarks, supra note 58 (observing
that Turkey is "moving rapidly to meet the criteria for membership").
83. Accession Partnership, supra note 69, at 40.
84.

2004 Report, supranote 73, at 54.
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and Political Rights8 5 and the International Covenant on Social and
Cultural Rights,8 6 as evidence of its progress. 87 While the EC recognized
that "implementation of the reforms is uneven,, 88 it concluded that
Turkey was ready to begin accession negotiations.8 9
The EC's 2005 Progress Report is more critical than its 2004
Report of Turkey's efforts in the areas of human rights and women's
equality. 90 The EC concluded in November 2005: "There has been little
progress regarding women's rights .... ."91 Evidence of this lack of
progress is found in the areas of domestic violence and honor killings,
which remain major problems in Turkey.9 2 The EC concludes its 2005
Report with an acknowledgement that "[g]reater attention is being paid
to women's rights, but violence against women remains a matter of
serious concern. 93 Thus, even the EC acknowledged that reforms have
not resulted in change as quickly as members had hoped a year earlier.
The EC's 2006 Progress Report similarly concludes: "The legal
framework is overall satisfactory, but implementation remains a
challenge., 94 While the EC is pleased with Turkish efforts to address the
problem of honor killings through both legal reform and a wider
nationwide domestic violence campaign, it also acknowledges that even
with new changes to the Penal Code, "sentences issued by courts reflect
a mixed picture. 95 Despite the "lack of reliable data" on honor crimes,
the EC is concerned with the fact that96these crimes have continued,
particularly in east and southeast Turkey.
Turkey is, however, officially committed to full compliance with
the EU criteria. The Turkish State Minister and Chief Negotiator at the
EU accession negotiations, Ali Babacan, stated on October 12, 2005 that
the first pillar of the EU negotiation process would consist of
"implementation of... all the Copenhagen political criteria [and] the
85. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
86. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 3.

87. See 2004 Report, supra note 73, at 16.
88. Id. at 12 (quoting 2003 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, COM
(2003) 676 final (Nov. 5, 2003)).
89. See Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council (Dec. 16, 2004), at 4-6.
90. 2005 Report, supranote 25, at 41.
91. Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 42.
94. Turkey: 2006 ProgressReport, at 18, COM (2006) 649 final (Nov. 8, 2006) [hereinafter
2006 Report].

95. Id.
96. Id.
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deepening and the refining of political reforms. 97 This implementation
of the Copenhagen Criteria is to be monitored by a Reform Monitoring
Group led by Abdullah Gil, the Turkish Foreign Minister and Deputy
Prime Minister. 98 Thus, Turkish authorities have committed themselves
publicly to complete compliance.
The Turkish government resolved to complete legislative materials
relevant to the Copenhagen Criteria "in letter and spirit" by June 2004. 9'
The process by which Turkey intends to implement these criteria is
through a number of "harmonization packages," which is a term for a
draft law approved by Parliament in a single voting session that amends
more than one code or law simultaneously. 100 These packages are
designed to bring Turkey in line with EU requirements by amending
groups of Turkish laws.' 0 The Turkish government is optimistic about
its ability to comply with EU criteria. As Abdullah G0l stated in
November 2005: "We are now entering a process of complete
harmonization. We are determined to pursue our reform agenda with a
special focus on implementation.' 1 2 In the women's rights arena, this
agenda has included the appointment of a Directorate General for the
for coordinating efforts to attack
Status of Women, who is responsible
03
the problem of honor crimes. 1
The U.S. government has consistently praised Turkish efforts to
comply with the EU criteria, as indicated by President Bush's
encouraging speech, quoted above. °4 Other sectors of the U.S.
government have echoed the President's optimism.'0 5 The U.S. Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has advanced this view: "The
[Turkish] Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens" and "the [Turkish] Government adopted extensive human
rights-related legal reforms designed to crack down on torture and

97. Ali Babacan, State Minister and Chief Negotiator on the EU Accession Process, Press
Conference in Ankara, Turkey (Oct. 12, 2005), http://www.fulltextnews.com/detay.php?id=
462&PHPSESSID=3b0635b9ff43e3f03ff23705b 17bafcd.
98. Id.
99.

See EU NATIONAL PROGRAMME, supra note 68.

100. EC Recommendation, supra note 29, at 3; EU NATIONAL PROGRAMME, supra note 68;
Kogacioglu, supra note 11, at 134.
101. EC Recommendation, supra note 29, at 3; EU NATIONAL PROGRAMME, supra note 68.
102. Gill, supranote 63.
103. 2006 Report, supra note 94, at 18.
104. See Bush, Remarks, supra note 58.
105. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE U.S. RECORD 2004-2005, at 156 (2005)
[hereinafter U.S. RECORD 2004-2005].
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'honor killings."' 0 6 While the U.S. government concluded that "it is too
early to assess what impact these reforms will have on actual
government practices," the tone of its report remains positive.'0 7 This
report is consistent with the State Department's previous country report,
in which the U.S. government praised Turkey for its positive approach to
its human rights record and recent democratic reforms, stating that
Erdogan's
government had developed a "zero tolerance" torture
08
policy.

IV.

A.

TURKISH LEGAL REFORM

Changes in the Turkish Penal Code

The initial optimism of the EC, Turkey and the United States is in
large part due to reforms to Tfirk Ceza Kanunu (Turkish penal code or
"TCK") that were scheduled to take effect on June 1, 2005. Former
Article 462, a provision stipulating mitigating defenses for homicide, is
particularly relevant in the honor killing context. The provision, which
has been revoked as part of Turkey's efforts to comply with EU
guidelines, covered "Special Aggravating Provocations"' 0 9 and stated
that a situation was "provocation if the perpetrator had discovered or
was convinced that one of his first-degree relatives [was] involved in an
illicit relationship."' " 0 Punishment for murder in this scenario could be
reduced by one-eighth of the original sentence. 1 ' Another translation of
Article 462 is:
Regarding the perpetrators who commit the offenses specified in the
two foregoing Chapters, against the wife, husband, sister or offspring,
at the time the victim is caught in the act of adultery or illegal sexual
intercourse, or while the victim was about to commit adultery or
engage in illegal sexual intercourse, or while the victim was in a

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY, THE U.S. RECORD 2003-2004, at 151 (2004).

109. Canan Arin, SEELINE--Constitutional Report: Turkey, http://web.archive.org/web/
2005111623252 1/www.seeline-project.net/reports/Turkey.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
110. Kogacioglu, supra note 11, at 122-23 (translating Article 462); see also Leyla Pervizat,
'Honor Killings' in Turkey: A Scapegoat: Article 462, FEMPOWER (European Information Centre
Against Violence/WAVE Office, Vienna, Austria), Mar. 2001, at 10, 11 & n.5 (translating that
language as "[i]f a relative surprises a family member in the act of adultery, or immediately before
the act, or immediately after the act," then the sentence reduction would be applied).
I 1!.

Kogacioglu, supra note 11, at 123.
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situation showing, free from any doubt, that he or she has just
completed the act of adultery or sexual intercourse; or against another
person caught participating in such acts with one of the aforesaid
relatives, or against both, the punishment prescribed for the offense
shall be reduced to 7/8 and heavy imprisonment shall be changed to
imprisonment. In view of heavy life imprisonment, imprisonment for
four to eight years shall be imposed, and in112view of death,
imprisonment for five to ten years shall be imposed.
This article was meant to describe crimes of passion" 3 or what
would be equivalent to the defense of extreme emotional disturbance or
provocation in U.S. law. The idea that it is acceptable to kill a woman
for perceived or actual deviance from her socially proscribed sexual role
is far from new. Ancient Roman law prescribed that men could
4
justifiably kill their wives for committing adultery." The rationale for
this law was that Roman men needed to be able to ensure that their male
children were really theirs. These children were set to inherit the father's
property and possessions, as well as his reputation, and thus it was
important to be certain about their "pedigree."' 15
The principle that a woman's adultery served as a valid mitigating
factor in assessing a murder charge also found its way into American
common law. 1 16 Adultery was viewed as "provocation" and thus, if a
man found another man committing adultery with his wife and murdered
7
that man, his murder charge would be reduced to manslaughter."l The
wife's male lover was considered by one court to be a "murderer of the
peace and respectability of a family[,] ... one who forcibly attacks
habitation and property" and is responsible for "the destruction of female
innocence."'"1 8 These personal assaults on the husband were viewed as
understandably provoking him to kill the perpetrator: the male lover.
In some courts, the mitigation defense was extended to apply when
a man killed his wife, rather than her lover: "And in principle there can
be no difference in the degree of the crime, whether the betrayed
husband slays the faithless wife or her guilty paramour. In either event

112. Canan Arin, SEELINE-Criminal Code Report: Turkey,
web/20051116232344/http://www.seeline-project.net/CCR/TurkeyCCR.htm
2007).
113. Id.

http://web.archive.org/
(last visited Feb. 12,

114. JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GuYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 335 (5th ed. 2004).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 332.
117. Id. (citing Reed v. State, 62 Miss. 405 (1884)).
118. Biggs v. State, 29 Ga. 723, 728-29 (1860).
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the crime proven has uniformly been held to be, not murder, but
manslaughter."' 1 9 The idea here is that seeing one's wife in the act of
adultery with another man would give rise to a reasonable and
understandably passionate rage, and thus serve to provoke the murder of
her or her lover. 120 By the mid-nineteenth century, American courts no
longer required that the man actually see his wife in the act.12' If a
reasonable, sensible man could conclude from the circumstances that his
1 22
wife was committing adultery, the mitigation defense could apply.
The provocation defense originated in the American context as an
honor code. 123 In some states, husbands who claimed to have committed
murder to protect their honor were acquitted. 124 Juries were thus able to
apply the mitigation to manslaughter rule in "honor defense" cases. 25 As
in the Turkish context, American husbands who were also murderers
were seen as protecting not only their own honor but their wives' as
well. 126 The Supreme Court of Georgia reasoned in 1860: "[I]f the wife
is too weak to save herself, is it not the privilege of the jury to say
whether the strong arm of the husband may not interpose, to shield her
and defend her from pollution?"' 127 Thus male violence, his "strong
arm," was considered justified when honor was at stake.
The idea that female innocence or virtue was to be protected at all
costs and that the protection of virtue, even in the case of consensual,
extramarital sexual relations, may justifiably require violence was a
prominent concept in American nineteenth century thinking: "What is
the annihilation of houses or chattels by fire and faggot compared with
119. Rowland v. State, 35 So. 826, 827 (Miss. 1904).
120. See KAPLAN, WEISBERG& BINDER, supra note 114, at 333.
121. Id.
122. Price v. State, 18 Tex. Ct. App. 474, 482-83 (1885) (holding that homicide is justifiable
where the husband sees his wife and her lover "in such a position as to indicate with reasonable
certainty to a rational mind that they had just then committed the adulterous act, or were then about
to commit it"). The husband does not have to be an "eye-witness to [the] physical coition of his wife
with the other party" in order for the defense to apply. Id.
123.

See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation

Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1339 (1997) (explaining the early approach to the "passion" defense
as one in which "the 'passion' depended upon the victim's wrong, in which the law assumed the
victim partially deserved her fate").
124.

KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 114, at335-36.

125. Id. at 336; See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Whitler, 2 Brewster 388, 393 (Pa. Ct. Oyer &
Terminer 1868) (acquitting a husband who found his wife in bed with another man and killed that
man with an axe on the grounds that "the frenzy which would take possession of a man under the
circumstances would be tantamount to insanity, and would make him irresponsible for the time
being").
126. See Biggs v. State, 29 Ga. 723, 726, 728-29 (1860) (equating the seduction of another
man's wife to "robbery" of her purity and innocence).
127. Id. at 729.
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the destruction of female innocence; robbing woman of that priceless
jewel which leaves her a blasted ruin?"'' 28 Under this logic, what man
would be able to keep his cool in the face of such an extreme assault on
his honor and that of his wife? Murder in this context becomes
reasonable and legitimate.
Similar assumptions about gender roles are at play in the Turkish
context. The American defense of provocation could hypothetically
apply to a female murderer who caught her husband in the act of
adultery, but this has very rarely happened.1 29 In fact, most American
women murderers who kill their husbands do so out of self-defense,
while American men kill their wives because of perceived rejection or
30
because their wives refuse to be dominated by their husbands.'
Because the historical rationale for this law was grounded in the idea of
male dominance and male protection of his property (wife and children),
it is not surprising that the mitigation defense typically is not used by
female defendants.' 3' In the Turkish context, while on its face, Article
462 could be applied to both men and women, in practice this article was
only applied to male perpetrators, and thus served to officially permit or
encourage honor crimes. 132 Article 462 was traditionally combined with
mitigating clause, in order to reduce sentences for
Article 51, the general
33
honor killings. 1
Article 51, still valid Turkish law, is also comparable to the
American concept of provocation. It states that if a perpetrator "has
committed murder because of 'uncontrollable grief' or as a result of
provocation, the sentence may be reduced by two-thirds."' 13 4 Article 462
effort to comply with EU
has been revoked as part of 1Turkey's
35
not.
has
51
Article
but
guidelines
A final penal code reform relevant to this issue is that Article 453
was amended to impose heavier sanctions for the "honour killings of
children."' 136 The sentence for honor killings of children has now been

128. Id. at 728-29.
129.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 114, at 335.
See id.
Id. at334-35.
Arin, supra note 112; Pervizat, supra note 110, at 10.
Id.
Kogacioglu, supranote 11, at 123.

135. SECRETARIAT GEN. FOR EU AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF TURK. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, POLITICAL REFORMS IN TURKEY 20 (2004) [hereinafter POLITICAL REFORMS IN TURKEY];

Kogacioglu, supra note 11, at 123.
136. POLITICAL REFORMS IN TURKEY, supra note 135, at 20.
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37
increased from four-to-eight years to eight-to-twelve years. 1
"Infanticide for family honor," the language used in Article 453, is the
Turkish legal term that distinguishes this crime from that 38of
manslaughter, which carries a sentence of twenty-four to thirty years.

B. Other Legal Reforms
In order to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey enacted
other legal reforms including amendments to the civil code that grant
women more legal rights in marriage. 139 In his justification for the
amendments, Justice Minister Mahmut Esat Bozkurt wrote that these
amendments "bolstered the social status of Turkey's women, providing
them with the same rights as any other citizen."'' 40 Additionally, on May
7, 2004, the Turkish Constitution was amended to include Article 10:
"Equality before the Law."'' This article now states: "Men and women
shall have equal rights. The State has the duty to ensure that this equality
is put into practice.' 42 Thus, women's equality with men is now legally
protected in Turkish law.
V.

A.

REMAINING PROBLEMS

Turkish PenalCode

Between their implementation in June 2005 and the publication of
the 2005 Report, the revisions to the Penal Code were reported to have
had an effect in only a few cases. 143 Notably, "in August 2005, the
137. PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HONOURING OF OBLIGATIONS AND
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/
262
(2004),
para.
BY
TURKEY
COMMITMENTS
WorkingDocs/doc04/EDOC 1011 !.htm.

138. Kogacioglu, supra note 11, at 123.
139. See, e.g., Basin-Yayin ve Enformasyon Genel Mdtlrligi, The Amendments to the
Turkish Civil Code, http://www.byegm.gov.tr/on-sayfa/new-civil-code.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2007). Amendments to the Civil Code recognize that: the "legal residence" of a married couple is no
longer the husband's residence alone (Article 21); a couple can now get married in the province
where either party resides, rather than just the husband's province (Article 134); a divorced woman
can keep her former spouse's name and a married woman is now allowed to keep her maiden name
though she must also take her husband's name (Article 173); the husband is no longer the de facto
legal "head of the family" (Article 186); both parties can participate in the determination of the
marital residence (Article 186) and a wife can now get a job without her husband's permission
(Article 192). Id.
140. Id.
141. Press Release, Department for Political Affairs, Secretariat General for EU Affairs,
Constitutional Amendments I (May 10, 2004) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
142. Id.
143. 2005 Report, supranote 25, at 32.
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[Turkish] Court of Cassation overturned the decision of a lower court,
which had reduced a prison sentence in relation to an honour crime
because the perpetrator was. . . 'provoked' by the victim."' 44 The
decision suggested that the new Penal Code did not stipulate that
sentences for honor crimes should be reduced. 145 Unfortunately, this is
merely the decision in one case and may not necessarily reflect the
current state of the law, let alone its practice. As explained above,
Article 462 was mostly used in conjunction with Article 51, which has
not been repealed. Article 51 states that "if a suspect has committed
murder because of 'uncontrollable grief or as a result of provocation,
the sentence may be reduced by two-thirds."' 146 This has left a loophole
in the law in that the general mitigation provision could readily be
applied to honor crimes without Article 462.147
A similar loophole remains in U.S. law. Section 210.3 of the Model
Penal Code (adopted by about a third of the states), 148 specifies that
murder may be mitigated to manslaughter when:
a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there
is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shal [sic] be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the
actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes
149
them to be.
Feminists have deeply criticized this newfound personalization of
the provocation defense as promoting continued gender bias. 150 The
loophole that remains is that men who kill their wives may be able to use
their wife's separation, dancing with another person, bringing a divorce
action or seeking a protective order, as grounds for a provocation
mitigation defense.'51
An inconsistency arises when American law recognizes a woman's
right to divorce her husband or go dancing, and then the provocation
defense can be used to mitigate a sentence for killing a woman who

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Kogacioglu, supranote 11, at 123.
147. Sebnem Arsu, Turks to Fight 'HonorKillings' of Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at
A13.
148. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 3 (1980).
149. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(b) (1980).
150. See Nourse, supra note 123, at 1384-89 (describing a feminist critique of provocation
reform and the liberal response to it).
151. Id.at 1332-33.
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engaged in one of these legally protected acts.152 In this way, the
provocation defense that remains on the books in the United States can
still be used by batterers to control their partners and thus serves as a
broader societal tool that can be used to control women as a class,
despite the fact that American laws officially protect women's rights.
In response to the legal loophole in Turkish law, and due to the
work of women's rights organizations in Turkey, the Turkish Penal
Code was amended to include two more provisions that are applicable to
honor crimes.153 Article 29, formerly known as the Unjust Provocation
article and now called the Unjust Acts article suggests that sentence
15 4
reductions for unjust provocation do not apply to honor crimes.
"However, the Justification [of Article 29] goes on to say that this may
not be the case in all honor killings" and thus, still allows for the
possibility that the mitigation defense will be used in some cases.155 As
in the American context, 156 where a mitigation defense exists in the law,
it can be applied to male-on-female gender-based violence, even if that
violence was a Turkish "honor crime."
Additionally, Article 82 covers aggravating circumstances for
homicide and has been amended to include "killings in the name of
custom.

1 57

The provision's applicability is narrowed by the use of the

word "custom" instead of "honor," as different varieties of honor crimes
may not be covered.158 In addition, Article 82 allows for the "unjust act"
provocation defense to be used in a case where a "killing[] in the name
of custom" has occurred. 159 Thus, while these amendments are
significant steps in the right direction, they do not completely eliminate
the possibility of sentence reductions for honor crimes. It is unlikely, in
light of the U.S. example, that we can expect Turkey to eliminate the
152. Id. at 1334.
153. ELA ANIL ET AL., WOMEN FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS (WWHR), TURKISH CIVIL AND
PENAL CODE REFORMS FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE: THE SUCCESS OF TWO NATIONWIDE
CAMPAIGNS 62 (2005).

154. Id. at 62-63.
155. Id.at 63.
156. See, e.g., People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 782 (Cal. 1976). In this case, a husband
murdered his wife by strangling her with a telephone cord. The husband's claim of provocation,
supported only by his own and his psychiatrist's testimony, was based on incidents in which his
wife allegedly told him that she was in love with another man. A police record existed showing that
the husband had choked his wife on at least one other occasion. Id. at 779.
157.

ANIL ET AL., infra note 165, at 63.

158. Id. Substituting "custom" instead of "honor killings" implies that these crimes occur only
in parts of Turkey where people adhere to these "customs." Those regions that adhere to "customs"
in this context are those governed, at least in part, by feudal law. See Arin, supra note 109.
159. ANIL ET AL., infra note 165, at 63. Successfully alleging an "unjust act" defense will not
result in a sentence of life in prison. Id.
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possibility of sentence reductions for honor crimes entirely. As
previously described, a defense for extreme emotional disturbance or
provocation still exists in American law and can be160 used to reduce
sentences in cases of male-on-female spousal violence.
Another problematic aspect of the Turkish Penal Code is that the
concept of "family honor" remains prevalent throughout it. For example,
Article 453 was amended to increase the sentence of perpetrators for
161
committing "infanticide for family honor" but only by four years.
Additionally, Article 475 calls for a reduction in punishment between
one-third to one-sixth of the regular sentence for child abandonment
"if
162
members of [a] 'dishonored' family abandon an illegitimate child."'
Articles 453 and 475 were historically used in combination with
other mitigating provisions that provided for reductions in sentencing
based on age-to exploit these provisions, the family council would
designate a young family member to commit the crime. 163 If the
murderer was less than eleven years old, he would not be charged for
murder at all1 64 If he was between eleven and eighteen years old, he
would be given a reduced sentence and his male family members would
not be charged. 65 Under the amended Turkish Penal Code, due to
pressure from women's rights groups, Article 38 now states that both the
perpetrator and the person who forced him to commit the crime are
punished equally. 66 Most importantly, if the person who commits the
crime under the American equivalent of duress is a minor, then the adult
67
who forced the child is given a longer sentence.
While this is another significant step in the right direction, there are
numerous other problematic provisions that remain in the Turkish Penal
Code. For example, Article 430 states that if a person abducts a minor
"with the intention of marriage" or "through force, violence, threats or
fraud and under lascivious feeling," the punishment is merely five to ten
years. 68 Article 423 imposes a six month to two year sentence for
promising to marry a woman over fifteen years old, "removing" her

160. See Nourse, supra note 123, at 1334-35 (noting that leaving or separating from spouse
often constitutes provocation and that trial courts have applied the defense to the defendant's violent
battering of his partner).

161.

See supra note 138 and accompanying text.

162.

Kogacioglu, supra note 11, at 123.

163.
164.

Id.
ANIL ET AL., supra note 153, at 63.

165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.

168.

Arin,supra note 112.
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virginity, and breaking that marriage promise thereafter. 169 Both of these
provisions perpetuate the idea that a woman's autonomy is not protected
by the law.
Whether a man "intends" to marry a woman should not affect the
legal punishment for kidnapping her. Such reasoning assumes that the
woman has no agency, that her intentions do not matter and that her
value as a person is substantially less than that of a male person. The
virginity removal law also detracts from a woman's autonomy by
assuming that no woman would engage in pre-marital sex without the
promise of marriage. The law also presumes that a woman's worth is
directly tied to her virginal status by punishing a man for "removing"
that status. Again the law presupposes that the woman has no control
over this virginity removal.
In this way, a law which at first seems like it may be beneficial to
women-the idea of a man promising to marry a woman, having sex
with her and then breaking that promise suggests that the woman in
question was manipulated, used or defrauded-may not really benefit
women at all. Instead, because these laws perpetuate the stereotype of
women as sexually passive victims they effectively allow maledominated society to regulate women's sexuality.
The remaining problematic penal code provisions shed light on the
fact that it is crucial that Article 462 not become the "scapegoat" for a
much larger problem. Even before the reform of the penal code, judges
did not usually think about or even apply Article 462.170 In a study of
200 cases in which judicial rationale included reference to "defence of
honour," only three cases were tried under Article 462.171 In short,
172 In the
despite the repeal of Article 462, honor killings persisted.
American context, Victoria Nourse suggests that legal reform cannot
eliminate the possibility that the same stories of male-on-female
violence and the same power dynamics found within them will find new
173
"doctrinal homes," regardless of changes in the law itself. She also
points out that eliminating the passion defense altogether is not an
appropriate solution. Emotions are often relevant in determining whether
there was malicious intent in a murder trial and thus are useful in
ascertaining guilt. 174 Nourse argues:
169. Id.
170.
171.

See Pervizat, supra note 110, at 10.
Id.

172. See id. (citing the Judicial Statistics of the State Institute of the Statistics).
173. Nourse, supranote 123, at 1405.
174. Id. at 1404-05.
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All one [American] can do is make it clear to juries, in this and other
contexts, that they cannot find the defendant guilty of a lesser crime
(whether that crime is second degree murder, passion manslaughter, or
reckless homicide) simply because of the decedent's departure or
moving out or dancing; that they cannot do this lest they contradict the
law's own commitments to such freedoms for all. There is no
assurance of justice here, only 1hopes
that we may, at least, see some
75

partialities in law's own mirror.

In the Turkish context, Article 29, the Unjust Acts article, which
suggests that the Turkish provocation defense should not apply to honor
crimes, is a small step in this direction. It seems however that much
broader social reform is necessary. In law and in practice, Turkish
society must recognize that women have the right to socialize with
whomever they want, go out, talk to men that are not related to them and
engage in day-to-day interactions without having to fear a violent attack
from their own family members. Resistance to this type of idea makes it
no surprise that problems in implementing the reforms and problems
76
with judicial practice remain prevalent, despite the change in the law.
B. Implementation, the Judiciaryand Prosecution
The disconnection between reforming laws to comply with
international changes and implementing those changes on the ground is
often large. As Nfiket Kardam writes: "The 'translation' of international
norms to national and local levels remains elusive, and there are many
gaps between global norms and local responses when it comes to
implementation."' 177 The 2004 Report on Turkey identified the general
problem that "[o]n the ground, implementation of the reforms is uneven.
In some cases, executive and judicial bodies entrusted with the
implementation of the political reforms relating to fundamental freedoms
adopted by Parliament have narrowed the scope of these reforms by
establishing restrictive conditions, hindering the objectives initially
178
'

pursued."

The U.S. government recognized this problem, saying: "The
[Turkish] Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however,
the judiciary was sometimes subject to outside influences.' 7 9 Judges
175. Id. at 1405.
176. EuR. PARL. DOC. (A6-0175) 4 (June 10, 2005) [hereinafter EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT].
177. NOCKET KARDAM, TURKEY's ENGAGEMENT WITH GLOBAL WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS 30

(2005).
178. 2004 Report, supra note 73, at 12 (quoting EC's 2003 Report).
179. U.S. REcoRD2004-2005, supra note 105, at 156.
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still systematically interpret laws in ways that privilege family honor:
"The value placed on family honor at the expense of women's welfare is
evident both in legal text and legal practice; it is not the problem of just
a few problematic codes."' 180 Interviews with Turkish civil court judges
have shown that they were open about their value of family honor and
the fact that they take it into account daily when dealing with cases:
They said they were certainly against the victimization of women in
these cases, yet they sympathized with their colleagues in the criminal
courts who routinely ordered reduced punishments for perpetrators of
honor crimes. Civil court judges saw their colleagues as
"appropriately" taking social norms into consideration when
judging. 181
Additionally, one of these civil court judges has remarked: "[I]t
wouldn't be appropriate to hand [the wife in a custody case] the child if
she sleeps around all the time. She has to behave in socially accepted
ways, in line with what is customarily considered to be a good mother.
Honor, after all, is a very important virtue.' 8 2 These comments illustrate
the systematic moral evaluation of women in terms of their "honor" in
the courts.
Given this context, it is not surprising that implementation of the
83
penal reforms has continued to be a serious problem in Turkey.' In the
more recent 2006 Report, the EC concluded that implementation of
penal reforms in the courts presents a "mixed picture."' 184 The EC reports
that while the courts imposed life sentences consistent with legal reforms
in some cases, they continued to administer lighter sentences in others,
especially if the perpetrators were minors.' 85 It is clear that prevalent
social attitudes do not change automatically with the law. On the
contrary, they likely contribute to the persistence of family violence in
Turkey, which includes honor crimes as well as domestic violence, and
forcing young women into marriage.' 86 Turkey's lack of statistics as well
as a lack of effective protection for victims or potential victims frustrates
efforts to directly address this problem.

180. Kogacioglu, supra note 11, at 124 (citation omitted).
181.

Id.

182. Id.
183. See 2005 Report, supranote 25, at 32.
184. 2006 Report, supra note 94, at 18.
185. Id.
186. See id. (observing that these circumstances are a premiere cause of "suicides committed
by women due to the influence of the family").
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Low-ranking state officials and the local police have widespread
sympathy for the perpetrators of honor crimes.' 87 These low-ranking
officials also engage in abuse and intimidation of women activists.' 8 It
is this injustice, combined with the inability and unwillingness of judges
at the local level to meet international human rights standards or even to
comply with newer Turkish legal reforms, 189 that perpetuates the fact
that one can commit an honor crime with the expectation of light
sentencing or none at all. There is also evidence that high-ranking
officials have engaged in sexual abuse, rape and even torture of women
in their custody,' 90 which further perpetuates the persistence of human
rights abuses and reinforces the idea that going to the police may not be
a safe option for a woman in fear for her life.
Additionally, there are only approximately thirty shelters for
victimized women in all of Turkey.' 9 1 If a woman did feel that her life
was at risk and sought to take preventive measures, she would not easily
be able to seek refuge. The absence of shelters or other non-familial safe
spaces is especially problematic in the context of honor killings, where
violence is almost exclusively inflicted on the victim by members of her
own family. Seeking protective shelter with extended family members is
likely impossible. These circumstances severely inhibit preventive
efforts and also make it difficult for women to get help after violence
occurs. Throughout southeast Turkey, parents have continually chosen to
not register girl babies at birth, making it impossible for authorities to
locate these women if they fall victim to an honor crime and
92
disappear. 1
Another problem is that Turkish women do not necessarily know
what rights they possess: "[W]omen are not necessarily informed about

187. See Kurdish Media, Ongoing Violence Against Kurdish Women in Turkey: What the EUTurkey Accession Talks Offer Women, Feb. 4, 2006, http://www.kurdmedia.com
/news.asp?id= 11281.
188.

Id.

189. See id.
190.

See, e.g., KWAHK, Turkey: The Women Who Have Spoken Out, Mar. 9, 2003,

http://www.kwahk.org/articles.asp?id=16. In 1996, Zeynep Avci, a twenty-one year old Kurdish
woman, was tortured while detained in Izmir over the course of twenty-five days in violation of the
Turkish Penal Code's mandate of fifteen days maximum detention. Her torture included electric
shock, rape by an officer of high rank and being forced to sit with an object in her anus, causing
anal bleeding. No action was taken against the perpetrators of this torture in Turkey. Furthermore,
when Avci's case went to the ECHR, Turkish authorities alluded to previous alleged sexual

misconduct to try to detract from her credibility. Id.
191.

2006 Report, supra note 94, at 18 & n.l l. This figure is "tentative." There are only

seventeen shelters instituted by the Social Services and Child Protection Institute. Id.
192. Id.
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their rights even if laws are passed and even if they are, they may be
powerless in the face of competing social norms of gender that promote
women's inferiority to men."'' 93 Furthermore, women in Turkey remain
largely uneducated and illiterate.194 The combination of ignorance
surrounding the law on the part of the judiciary, local police, state
officials and Turkish women themselves; general societal views about
women's proper role in Turkish society and the value placed on honor
and the lack of effective preventive or protective structures frustrates any
implementation of recent legal reforms.
In light of recent penal code changes and a movement to change
societal attitudes about honor crimes, the crimes themselves have begun
to take a different form-suicide.' 95 The preliminary report of the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women states that honor crimes
are one of the causes of suicides among Turkish women and that these
suicides are often ignored by authorities, particularly in southeast
Turkey. 196 For example, in Batman, Turkey, a city in the southeast, there
have been 102 suicide attempts by women between 2000 and 2006.197
One woman who attempted suicide, seventeen year old Derya, had a
romantic relationship with a boy in school. 198 When her mother found
out, she warned Derya that her father was going to kill her. Despite the
fact that Derya's own aunt had been killed by her grandfather for
allegedly sullying the family's honor, Derya ignored her mother's
warning. 199 Then she started to get text messages from her uncles and
brothers, sometimes fifteen a day, threatening her life: "'You have
blackened our name.... Kill yourself and clean our shame or we will

kill you first."' 200 Derya decided that she had no other option but death,
so she unsuccessfully tried to kill herself numerous times: by drowning
herself in the Tigris River, hanging herself and cutting her wrists with a
knife. 20 1 Derya revealed: "'My family attacked my personality, and I felt
I had committed the biggest sin in the world.... I felt I had no right to
dishonor my family, that I have no right to be alive. So I decided to

193.

KARDAM, supra note 177, at 30.

194.
195.
196.
197.

2006 Report, supra note 94, at 18.
Id.
See id.
Dan Bilefsky, 'Virgin Suicides'Save Turks' 'Honor',INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 13, 2006,

at 1.

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting her family members' order).
201.

Id.
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respect my family's desire and to die."' 20 2 Only by fleeing to a women's
shelter was Derya able to save her life.20 3
Derya's case is an example of an emerging trend of "honor suicide"
in Turkey. 2° In response to the penal code reforms, families have
replaced pressure on younger male family members to kill their female
family members, with pressure on their female family members to kill
themselves. This pressure often consists of locking a girl in a room for
an extended period of time with nothing but rat poison, a gun or a rope
and telling her that the only salvation from disgrace for her and her
family is suicide. Families also continue to kill their female relatives
themselves, but disguise the death as suicide. 20 5 As Derya aptly put it, as
long as gender inequality is explicitly and implicitly sanctioned in
Turkey, these crimes will continue: "'In my village and in my father's
tribe, boys are in the sky while girls are treated as if they are under the
earth.',' 20 6 Notably, Derya blames family paranoia surrounding their
female relatives for the persistence of this problem: "As long as families
do not trust their daughters, bad things will continue to happen., 20 7 The
tendency to replace "honor killings" with "honor suicide" is a disturbing
reaction to reforms that Turkey has enacted in the interest of accession.
C.

"Tradition"

TEVYE AND PAPAS

Who, day and night,
Must scramblefor a living,
Feed a wife and children,
Say his dailyprayers?
And who has the right,
As master of the house,
To have the final word at home?
The Papa,the Papa-Tradition.
The Papa,the Papa-Tradition.
DAUGHTERS

And who does Mama teach

202.

Id. (quoting Derya).

203.
204.

See id.
Id.

205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id. (quoting Derya).
Id. (quoting Derya).
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To mend and tend andfix,
Preparingme to marry
Whoever Papapicks?
The daughters, the daughters-Tradition.
20 8
The daughters, the daughters-Tradition.

Another factor that frustrates efforts to target honor killings in
Turkey is the fact that the West, the international community more
broadly and even many Turkish citizens, including Turkish judges
attribute honor killings to "tradition., 20 9 This construction of the
problem ignores the complexity of the issue and negates structures of
inequality and power that contribute to the prevalence of honor killings.
The "tradition effect," the idea that modernization (or increased
westernization, for example, accession to the EU) will automatically
solve the problem of honor killings, is a dangerous and problematic
notion.21 °
The "tradition effect" perpetuates the idea that the existence of
honor killings is somehow distinct from the institutions that may
perpetuate their existence: "When violence against women is framed as a
matter of 'tradition,' a distinction is established between, on the one
hand, traditions-which are seen to be native, timeless, and
unchanging-and on the other, institutions-which appear as
contemporary and timely."21 1 This characterization detracts attention
from ways that institutions could be changed to attack the problem of
honor killings, creates a sense of perpetual, unavoidable victimization of
Turkish women and helps to perpetuate the myth that honor killings only
occur in less-modern rural areas.
For example, in April 2001, male relatives reportedly shot and
killed two sisters (twelve and fourteen years old) and their female cousin
(seventeen years old) for allegedly socializing with boys. 212 Ismail Kaya,
a relative of the family, was understandably saddened by these events:
"'They were children; they were very young.'" '2 13 However, Kaya
accepted the violence as natural or part of tradition: "'This is our
tradition. Tradition has to be followed.' ' 214 And so, social and political

208.

Sheldon Harnick, Tradition, in JOSEPH STEIN, FIDDLER ON THE ROOF 3-4 (1964).

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Kogacioglu, supranote 11, at 118-20.
Id. at 120-21.
Id. at 120.
Moore, supra note 1.
Id. (quoting Ismail Kaya).
Id. (quoting Ismail Kaya).
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institutions are viewed by men and women alike as separate from the
inevitable violence: "[O]nce tradition is invoked, the complex picture in
which honor crimes come to occur, including the involvement of the
institution, is ignored., 21 5 Modem legal reforms, thus, are viewed as not
having any connection to or effect on this "traditional" form of violent
social control. Laws change, yet honor crimes continue to occur.
This view is prevalent even in foreign countries with immigrant
216
A psychologist who
populations, such as England and Germany.
works at a shelter for abused women in Germany stated: "'People come
to Germany for the privileges of a free society-education, social
security-but they don't always want everything else that comes with it.
They don't want girls doing whatever they want or women revolting
against patriarchal order... . Nationalities and passports may change,
but attitudes don't.' 21 7 Even in countries with more established and
developed penal law, the notion that honor crimes are intrinsically and
almost unavoidably linked to national or ethnic identities or traditions
prevails.
The idea that traditional forms of violence against women are
beyond the arm of the law is a gendered concept, as illustrated by a
comparison to the "tradition" of blood feud.218 Blood feud is a rivalry
between two families where each family kills a male member of the
other family. The victims in this "tradition" of violence are always male.
There are no legal reductions in Turkish law for blood feud, and in fact,
the legal penalty for this crime is increased if the death is found to be the
consequence of blood feud. In practice, judges also consistently
denounce blood feud. Thus, in law and in practice, Turkish authorities
treat this "tradition" of violence against males in the exact opposite way
that they have historically viewed honor killings. 2 9 A "tradition" of
violence against males is condemned, whereas a "tradition" of violence
against females is viewed as an unchangeable, intrinsic part of Turkish
society. 220
This "tradition effect" is analogous to modem feminist debates
about the use of the term "culture." As Bonnie Honig points out: "When
men or states claim that 'my culture made me do it,' they are claiming a
215. Kogacioglu, supra note 11, at 121.
216. See Christine Spolar, For Family Honor, She Had to Die, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 2005, at C1
(reporting on incidents of honor killings by Turkish families living in Berlin, Germany and West
London, England).
217. Id. (quoting Corinna Ter-Nedden).
218. Koglacioglu, supra note 11, at 125.
219. Id.
220. See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/17

30

Boon: They Killed Her for Going out with Boys: Honor Killings in Turkey
2006]

HONOR KILLINGS IN TURKEY

kind of privacy or privilege that must surely be resisted for the sake of
both human rights and 'culture': neither is well served by it."'22I Not only
is it harmful for perpetrators to use this excuse in attempting to avoid
serving adequate time in prison, but it is also harmful when people both
inside and outside the culture use this explanation for the phenomenon
of honor crimes.
Attributing honor crimes to "tradition" or "culture" leads to the
conclusion that the problem is too pervasive to effectively target within
the culture itself and also allows outsiders to dismiss the problem as a
foreign phenomenon. Blaming honor crimes on "tradition" also leads to
offensive ethnic and racial stereotyping. For western feminists,
attributing this form of violence to a culture's "tradition" enables us to
detach ourselves from it, evoking the idea that such violence is a part of
someone else's less civilized or less developed culture. As the familiar
(to most Americans) lyrics of Fiddler on the Roof illustrate, the idea of
"tradition" as a justification for upholding gender norms that privilege
men over women is really prevalent across cultures, and not solely
located in a non-Western context like Turkey.
As previously discussed, American legal history has similarly
recognized the idea of male "honor" as directly tied to a female family
member's virtue. 222 American law continues to allow a mitigation
defense of extreme emotional disturbance or "provocation" that is used,
in some cases, as a justification or mitigating explanation for male-onfemale violence.2 23 Furthermore, Americans have a long history of
ignoring domestic violence or dismissing it as a family matter, making it
seem inappropriate for public law to interfere.224 Acknowledging the
"tradition" of tolerating male-on-female violence in our own American
culture renders the ascription of honor crimes to a foreign culture's
"tradition" suspect.
The fact of the matter is that male violence exists everywhere and
cannot and should not be explained away by the perpetrator's ethnic or
religious affiliation. This argument has gained much validity in feminist

221. Bonnie Honig, "My Culture Made Me Do It", in SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 35, 36 (Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha C.
Nussbaum eds., 1999).
222. See KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 114, at 335-36.
223. See, e.g., People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976).
224. For example, the English common law "rule of thumb," adopted by the American
colonies, legally sanctioned domestic violence. See, e.g., VICTOR RIVAS RIVERS, A PRIVATE
FAMILY MATTER: A MEMOIR (2005) (recounting the story of the author's abusive father, the
inadequacy of legal remedies and his eventual kidnapping by his own father).
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camps that seek to make women's rights human rights,225 and could
prove useful in this context. Attributing basic human rights violations,
such as the murder of women for the sake of "honor," to "tradition" or
"culture" serves to validate or justify practices that would otherwise be
condemned as unacceptable.22 6 Furthermore, it reinforces the complex
social structures, institutions and practices that perpetuate the human
rights violations. Rather than focusing on courthouse practice or the
unavailability of safe spaces for women who feel that they are in danger
of becoming victims of an honor crime, blaming honor crimes on
"tradition" leads those both inside and outside the "culture" to, albeit
perhaps unintentionally, allow the practice to continue.227 Viewing
women's rights as human rights may allow attention to be refocused on
reforming the institutions that tacitly allow the practice to continue.
D. The EU's Gender MainstreamingApproach to GenderEquality
The EU's own framework for analyzing gendered issues may also
contribute to the persistence of honor killings despite all of the attempts
at reform. The EU's gender mainstreaming approach does not lend itself
to in-depth analysis of the honor killing problem, which is seen as only
affecting women, not both genders.228 In her article on gender
mainstreaming in the United Nations, Hilary Charlesworth describes the
process of gender mainstreaming as a strategy that seeks to prevent
issues of gender inequality from being addressed in separate women's
institutions, instead to be addressed in the "mainstream" or "central,
normal" institutions. 229 Charlesworth argues that this approach "detracts
attention from the ways that sexed and gendered inequalities are woven
into the international system" and effectively makes it harder to identify
225. See generally Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human
Rights Issue, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 36 (1993) (arguing that in order for domestic violence to be a human
rights issue, states must apply domestic criminal law in a nondiscriminatory, systematic manner).
226. See generally UMA NARAYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES: IDENTITIES, TRADITIONS, AND

THIRD-WORLD FEMINISM 83-157 (1997) (examining misconceptions in the ways that Westerners
understand Indian bridejbuming and comparing this practice of "death by culture" to domestic
violence in the United States); Leti Volpp, Essay, Blaming Culturefor Bad Behavior, 12 YALE. J.L.
& HUMAN. 89 (2000) (explaining that Americans tend to attribute inhumane practices to "culture"
when they occur in non-white, non-Western contexts, and examining this concept in the context of
forced child marriages).
227. Kogacioglu, supra note 11, at 121 ("With the utterance of tradition, questions of violence
against women and of the violation of their most basic rights fade away without being seriously
addressed.").
228. Id. at 136-37.
229. Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving But Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human
Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 1 (2005).
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and target problems of gender inequality. 230 Perhaps this approach helps
to account for the EU's focus on general human rights and gender
equality, rather than the specific problem of honor killings, a violent
crime that is only committed against women.
While the goals of the gender-mainstreaming approach are validto prevent women's issues from falling to the wayside or being swept up
under the umbrella of a larger problem and then ignored2 3 1-this
approach arguably does not work well in the Turkish context where
honor killings are viewed as an issue that only affects women.23 2 In
Turkey, institutional resources and mechanisms designed to prevent
violence against women are either insufficient or do not exist. Thus,
basic institutional changes, such as increasing the availability of safe
spaces for victims in the 'form of shelters or hotlines, educating the
judiciary on violence against women or training local law enforcement
in how to respond to or prevent family violence could significantly
combat the problem.233 The issue of honor killings, thus, directly
conflicts with the EU's current approach: "[T]he issue of honor crimes
as it currently stands lands squarely in the arena of specific projects
targeting women, which lie in the opposite direction of gender
234
mainstreaming.",

Refraining honor killings as an issue that affects both men and
women would allow it to be incorporated into the array of issues
addressed by EU gender mainstreaming. However, it may result in the
difficulties that Charlesworth has identified. While it is necessary to
recognize that Turkish women's rights are human rights, that is, that
every Turkish woman is guaranteed fundamental freedoms under the
law, the method that would most effectively enable Turkish women to
exercise these freedoms may involve women-specific initiatives, rather
than a gender-mainstreaming approach. EU methodology creates a loselose situation for victims of honor killings. If the issue of honor killings
is reframed as an issue that affects both men and women alike and
society as a whole, which I argue, it certainly does, the EU's gender
mainstreaming approach may apply. However, re-conceptualizing the
problem in this way may not allow for the kinds of gender-targeted
reforms that are necessary to really make a difference.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 2.
Kogacioglu, supra note 11, at 136.
Id. at 137.
See id.
Id.
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A WORKABLE SOLUTION AND U.S. INTERESTS

A.

What the EU Should Do

Perhaps the solution to the problem identified above is for the EU
to fund pre-existing grassroots efforts targeting honor killings in Turkey,
rather than forming new EU-run organizations that risk being viewed as
foreign, rejected and thus, rendered ineffective. This may avoid the
tensions between EU methodology and realistic necessity. Turkish
women are arguably in a better position than western bureaucrats to
judge what will work in their country and have already advanced
suggestions for ways that Europeans can help them in their fight against
honor killings.235
In fact, Turkey has already begun to see the birth of a national
campaign targeting honor killings, specifically, and violence against
women, more generally. 236 The nationwide awareness-raising campaign
is a result of a governmental and non-governmental joint effort with
grant financing from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office.237
The campaign consists primarily of television awareness advertisements
starring prominent Turkish personalities, billboards and flyers. 238 As of
November 2006, "most" newspapers and television stations publicize
advertisements that are part of the "Stop Domestic Violence"
campaign.23 9
Unfortunately, as previously discussed, help for victims remains
limited. Estella Schmid, active in the Peace in Kurdistan campaign, has
said that the changes in Turkey have thus far "largely only been of a
cosmetic nature., 240 Deputy director of the Diyarbakir Human Rights
Association, 24 ' Reyhan Yalcindag, has pointed out: "'Even if [women]
had the courage to file an official complaint, they still must go back to
the home where they are targets, and live among the very people they
have made charges against."'' 242 Thus, without a safe space to shelter
235. See, e.g., Kurdish Media, supra note 187 (discussing the events of a "public meeting
hosted by Lynne Featherstone [a member of the British Parliament] that took place in the House of
Commons" on Jan. 30, 2006).
236. See Arsu, supra note 147.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See 2006 Report, supra note 94, at 18.
240. Kurdish Media, supra note 187.
241. Diyarbakir is the largest city in southeast Turkey; as of May 2005, there were no shelters
there. Arsu, supra note 147.
242. Id. (quoting Reyhan Yalcindag).
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potential victims, the ability to file an official complaint is rendered less
significant and doing so may even exacerbate violence once a woman
returns home. These are problems that could be more effectively
addressed by those familiar with them if more funds were available.
In furtherance of the national awareness campaign, other Turkish
initiatives have been undertaken.2 43 In November 2004, the Law
Establishing the Directorate General for the Status and Problems of
Women was enacted.244 The Directorate is charged with coordinating
efforts to attack the problem of honor crimes.245 In August 2005, "a
regulation was issued on the establishment of an Advisory Board on the
Status of Women," which includes "representatives from all Turkish
ministries as well as individuals from relevant academic institutions and
NGOs. ' 24 6 This group was set up to advise on the execution of state
policies regarding the status of women and to regulate the Directorate
General.24 7 Other groups were established, including a Parliamentary
Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality and a Committee
on Violence against Women and Children.248 The Committee on
Violence against Women and Children's purpose is to study the causes
of honor killings and develop ways to prevent them.249 While these
efforts are commendable, as of 2006, the Directorate remained
understaffed and the Advisory Board on the Status of Women had not
met once during the 2006 reporting period. 250 As the European
Parliament has resolved, "a clear mandate and sufficient funding and
staff' are necessary to effectively launch Turkey's nationwide
campaign. 251 Time shall tell how effective these bureaucracies will be.
One thing the EU can and should do is to ensure that programs
currently receiving or that will in the future receive EU funding are
adequately respecting women's rights. The EU should also ensure that
those in charge of developing and implementing strategies for change
are extensively familiar with the real concerns and actual living
conditions of Turkish women from varying geographic, socioeconomic
and cultural backgrounds. Ideally, Turkish women will play an integral
role in each part of this process, which will avoid a situation where a
See, e.g., 2005 Report, supra note 25, at 32.
Id.
See 2006 Report, supra note 94, at 18.
2005 Report, supranote 25, at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
2006 Report, supra note 94, at 19.
251. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supranote 176, at 6.

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
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Western, foreign power is dictating what life is like and controlling the
actions of citizens of another country. This will help prevent resistance
to foreign-funded efforts.
Primarily, those working for the EU-funded initiatives should be
talking to Turkish women to identify problems and come to solutions
that may actually work. Women all over the world are already meeting
to discuss this problem and what to do about it. 2 EU-funded initiatives
could provide a forum for their ideas to be heard. Basic socioeconomic
programs would also be a crucial part of this process. As Abdulkerim
Adem, mayor of Yalim, stated: "'People here are unaware of their rights.
Poverty has left them prisoners of the feudal way of life.' 2 53 For many
in more rural areas, disobeying tribal law is not a realistic option.
Selahattin Demirtas, from the Diyarbakir Human Rights Association
identified this problem: "'What father wants to kill his daughter? It is
impossible for many to defy the tribe. Its power can crush the love a
parent feels for his child.' 25 4 Education and awareness-raising measures
in areas dominated by tribal clans may more effectively address this
phenomenon. An influx of trained, local law enforcement authorities
would also help, especially when combined with programs that develop
strategies to empower Turkish women.25 5
Talking about the problem, something that the discussion
surrounding Turkey's accession to the EU has precipitated, is a first step
towards finding ways to attack it. 256 Improving shelters and community
services for women who fear that they may become victims of honor
killings is a crucial part of the process as well. A focus on both
prevention and protection is necessary in this type of context, where
change is not quick. Europeans should be encouraged to visit Turkey to
see for themselves what is taking place and talk to Turkish women about
what to do about it. 257 Speakers have also identified the value of and
necessity for collecting evidence and statistics about honor crimes, in
order to show Turkish authorities and the world just how extensive the
problem is. 258 Additionally, it is clear that in-depth training is needed on
252. See, e.g., Kurdish Media, supra note 187.
253. Ayla Jean Yackley, Honour Killings Tarnish Turkey's Rights Drive, REUTERS, Apr. 26,
2004, availableat http://kwahk.org/articles.asp?id=46 (quoting Abdulkerim Adem).
254. Id.
255. For a discussion of different strategies for the empowerment of Turkish women, see Filiz
Kardam & Nilket Kardam, Empowerment Through Training,in KARDAM, supra note 177, at 82, 82107.
256. Yackley, supra note 253.
257. Kurdish Media, supra note 187.
258. Id.
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the local level to combat both ignorance of the law and bias or prejudice
against the victims. The police, low-ranking state officials and judges
play a crucial role in implementing any platform for change and should
be a focus of EU-funded efforts.2 59
B. Turkey as a Modelfor Iraq: What the United States Can Gain
"Human rights are defined by a constitution; they're defended by an
impartial rule of law; they're secured in a pluralistic society. The
advance of women's rights and the advance of liberty are ultimately
inseparable. ,260

Since the very early stages of the Iraqi project, President Bush has
insisted that the position of Iraqi women and women's rights, generally,
are an important part of the development of Iraqi democracy. 261 The
Bush Administration has continued to adamantly assert that things have
improved for Iraqi women since the U.S.-U.K.-led invasion.262 For
example, recall the moving photos of Iraqi women holding up inkstained fingers to show that they voted in the recent elections,
symbolizing the interconnectedness of democracy and women's rights
and widely circulated throughout the nation's press. The Bush
Administration has, furthermore, consistently maintained that it and the
American plan for Iraq stand in direct opposition to the "terrorists" who
oppress women and upon whom Bush has waged war.263
These bold statements and the claim that women's rights in Iraq
have improved dramatically seem to be at odds with reports from human
rights organizations and women's groups who claim that conditions for
Iraqi women actually have worsened in concrete ways since the fall of
Saddam and the U.S.-U.K.-led occupation. 264 Just as the EC and
259. Id.
260. U.S. Department of State, United States Supports Women's Empowerment in Iraq: Fact
Sheet, Aug. 15, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2005/Aug/15-797327.html [hereinafter
State Department Fact Sheet] (quoting George W. Bush, Remarks at Conference: Efforts to
Globally Promote Women's Human Rights (Mar. 12, 2004)).
261.

See, e.g., RESULTS IN IRAQ: 100 DAYS TOWARD SECURITY AND FREEDOM 21-22 (2003),

available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/l00days/100days.pdf (discussing steps taken
by the United States to involve Iraqi women in the new government).
262. See, e.g., State Department Fact Sheet, supra note 260.
263. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Address of the President to the Nation (Dec. 18, 2005),
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2005/Dec/19-15664.html (urging that the fight is
one against "a global terrorist movement that exploits Islam in the service of radical political aimsa vision in which books are burned, women are oppressed, and all dissent is crushed").
264. See, e.g., AMNESTY, IRAQ, supra note 22, at I (explaining that killings, abduction and rape
have increased since the U.S.-led invasion); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLIMATE OF FEAR:
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prominent Turkish authorities hope that Turkey will provide a model of
a truly modem Arab state, so too, the Bush Administration wants Iraq to
serve as a model of democracy and women's rights for the rest of the
Arab world. With such closely related goals in mind, the fact that Turkey
is arguably further along in its work towards reaching that goal (albeit
with a long way to go), leads to the conclusion that if honor killings
were effectively targeted in Turkey, Turkey could in fact serve as a
model for Iraq in its own fight against the prevalence of honor crimes.
Iraqi women have historically been active in civil society, and
before the Gulf War in 1991, they were able to exercise relatively more
rights than women could in neighboring Middle Eastern countries.2 6 5
Prior to 1968, a number of women's organizations were active in Iraq.
The Ba'ath party, which took power by coup d'etat in 1968, eliminated
these pre-existing groups, but established a General Federation of Iraqi
Women ("GFIW") that ran more than 250 centers in both rural and
urban areas that provided a variety of social programs and training to
Iraqi women.266 While some Iraqi women have criticized this
organization as too politically oriented to adequately represent oppressed
Iraqi women, women did play prominent roles in the organization, and
the organization lobbied for a number of legal reforms to improve
conditions for Iraqi women. 267 Ba'ath initiatives also included legislation
of compulsory education for women, of literacy initiatives run by the
GFIW and of labor and employment laws, including maternity benefits
and protection against sexual harassment at work.268 The number of Iraqi
women working outside the home steadily increased during this time
period.269
Following the Gulf War in 1991, conditions for women worsened
for a number of reasons.27 ° Saddam's strategic celebration of Islamic
tribal traditions; U.N. sanctions that disproportionately affected female
children (when faced with the financial necessity of only being able to
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND ABDUCTION OF WOMEN AND GIRLS IN BAGHDAD 1 (2003) [hereinafter
CLIMATE OF FEAR] (explaining that sexual violence and abduction of women have increased in

Baghdad because of a complete lack of public security following the U.S.-led invasion).
265. Human Rights Watch, Background on Women's Status in Iraq Prior to the Fall of the
Saddam Hussein Government 1 (Nov. 2003) (Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper) [hereinafter
HRW Brief], available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/wrd/iraq-women.pdf. The Iraqi
Provisional Constitution of 1970 gave women formal equality, as well as the rights to vote, go to
school, hold political office and own property. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1-2.
268. Id. at 2.
269. See id. at 2-3.
270. Id. at 3.
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send one child to school, parents chose the male), and changes in the
labor code, criminal justice system and personal status laws hurt the
legal status of Iraqi women and also facilitated many of their exits from
the workplace and returns to the home. 271 The U.N. reported that from
1991-2001, approximately 4000 women were victims of honor killings
in Iraq.272 A report from KWAHK confirms that this crime occurred
273
frequently throughout the 1990S.
274 and
While Kurds in northern Iraq outlawed honor killings
suspended laws allowing for mitigation defenses such as "honourable
motivation, ' '275 there is no question that these crimes still occur and that
their perpetrators often receive light sentences, if they are prosecuted at
all.276 Just as in Turkey, legal reforms, including the removal of a
mitigating defense to honor crimes is not enough to eliminate the
phenomenon in Iraq. Families may hide or mutilate the bodies to conceal
277
evidence, choose not to prosecute or bribe officials for protection.
Police protection is far from adequate278 and safe houses, though
growing, are still few and far between.279
The instability and violence that characterized Iraq following the
official end of the war have, without a doubt, had a concrete negative
effect on the lives of Iraqi women.2 8 ° While Iraqi women face newer
horrors such as being kept virtual prisoners in their homes because of the
dangers of walking outside at night, and a rise in sexual violence and the
abduction of Iraqi girls and women,28' the older practice of honor
killings remains a prevalent problem.28 2 Perpetrators of honor killings,
like other criminals, were not prosecuted in the chaos following the
war.283 In fact, the lack of a functional judicial system in the wake of the
2003 war led tribal authorities to assume larger roles in conflict

271. Id. at 3-4. For example, by the end of 2000, less than twenty-five percent of Iraqi women
were literate-down from the seventy-five percent literacy rate among women in 1987. Id.
272. Id. at 4 (citing U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/83 (Jan. 31, 2002)).
273. AMNESTY, IRAQ, supra note 22, at 16 (citing KWAHK, Honour Killing-A Catalogue of
Horror, May 2000 (reporting hundreds of instances of honor killing in northern Iraq alone)).
274. Spolar, supra note 216.
275. HRW, Brief, supra note 265, at 4.
276. See AMNESTY, IRAQ, supra note 22, at 18.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 19.
279. See Vivienne Walt, Marked Women, TIME, July 26, 2004, at 42.
280. See CLIMATE OF FEAR, supra note 264, at 1;Walt, supra note 279, at 42.
281. See, e.g., CLIMATE OF FEAR, supra note 264, at 3-7.
282. Walt, supranote 279, at 43.
283. AMNESTY, IRAQ, supra note 22, at 19.
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resolution, including proceedings for honor crimes.284 The decisions of
tribal councils often do not reflect an engagement with or respect for
women's rights. For example, in 2004 in al-'Amara, a husband with two
wives killed the younger one for allegedly having an affair during a
period of his prolonged absence. In the ensuing settlement, the tribunal
did not impose any punishment on the perpetrator. Instead, the tribunal
required the family of the victim to pay the husband.28 5
Vivienne Walt, reporting from Baghdad, wrote that there had been
a dramatic increase in honor crimes following the U.S.-U.K.-led
occupation, citing Iraqi professionals who "believe that women are now
being murdered by their kin at an unprecedented rate. 286 Amnesty
International, however, reported that there was not enough evidence
available to determine whether the number of killings has increased.2 87
However, there is agreement that honor killings do occur and that
prosecution of the perpetrators does not.288 Furthermore, honor crimes
encompass many more violations of women's rights in Iraq than murder
alone-honor crimes do not just consist of honor killings.289 Iraqi
victims of honor crimes are often subject to mutilation rather than
outright murder and they are forced to live in fear once suspicions of
sexual misconduct are made known because there are not adequate
290
shelters in Iraq.
Additionally, the practice of virginity testing is widespread in
Iraq.29 ' It is common, even more so following the war, for a woman to
be brought to the virginity-testing room of a place like the Baghdad
Forensics Institute where her genitals are examined by three male
doctors who then conclude whether or not the woman is a virgin. For
many Iraqi women, the results of this "test" mean the difference between
life and death.292 If an honor crime case arises later on, the results serve
as evidence for the defense if the woman is found not to be a virgin.293
Police and judges continue to be widely sympathetic to the perpetrators
of honor crimes.294

284. Id.
285.

Id.

286. Walt, supra note 279, at 42.
287. AMNESTY, IRAQ, supra note 22, at 19.
288. See id.; Walt, supra note 279, at 44.
289. See Walt, supra note 279, at 44.
290. Id. at 45; see also AMNESTY, IRAQ, supra note 22, at 17.
291. Walt, supra note 279, at 44.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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There are a number of parallels between the occurrence of these
crimes in Iraq and in Turkey. The fact that these crimes are often
attributed to the Kurdish minority in both of these countries has created a
sense of solidarity between some Iraqi and Turkish Kurdish women and
has prompted joint discussions of this problem.29 5 The idea that honor
crimes are so ingrained in culture and tradition that the problem is
insurmountable is also prevalent in both societies. As one Iraqi put it:
"'The idea of honor is in our cultural backyard. Ethnically and
culturally, we believe it.'296
Cultural, ethnic and religious ties, when combined with the practice
of honor killings in both societies, breed potential commonalities in
targeting this problem. Shared American and European goals of creating
a model Arab state in Iraq and Turkey, respectively, should facilitate
mutual support and encouragement of these projects. Thus, the United
States does have something to gain by supporting the movement to
combat honor killings in Turkey: It can learn lessons that may prove
useful to its own democracy project in Iraq, a project in which the
United States has invested an incredible amount of time, money,
manpower and American lives.
VII.

CONCLUSION

"'I think now I have the power to fight with injustice. And my family
cannot oppress me as before. They are aware that I'm not alone, I
havefriends and an organizationbehind me.... -297

In order for Turkey to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria, a necessity
for its accession into the EU, honor killings must be effectively targeted
and eliminated in Turkey. This practice should not be dismissed as an
infallible part of "tradition" or written off as a remote practice of a
particular, stigmatized ethnic group. Rather, Turks and the EU need to
acknowledge that not only are honor crimes pervasive throughout the
country, but that they reflect a broader societal practice of disrespecting
women's rights due to ignorance and lack of education or even overt
denial.

295. See, e.g., Kurdish Media, supranote 187.
296. Spolar, supra note 216 (quoting Mohammed Ahmed).
297. Kardam & Kardam, supra note 255, at 82 (quoting thirty-seven year old Zeliha from KaMer, which is the Women's Center in Diyarbakir-an organization established to help victims of
domestic violence). Zeliha suffered abuse at the hands of her husband and his family as well as her
own parents, when she returned to their home after her husband's abandonment. Id.
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While legal reforms that promote women's equality and changes to
the penal code that eliminate the mitigation defense are a step in the
right direction, without a broader grassroots movement that addresses
the socioeconomic and institutional factors that contribute to the
pervasiveness of the crime and the ability of the perpetrators to avoid
legal consequences, this problem will not go away. As Abdulkerim
Adem observed: "'It will take more than a pronouncement from Ankara
2 98
to change the structures that led to this death.'
Because the problem of honor crimes is acute in both Turkey and
Iraq, Turkish and Iraqi victims and Kurdish minorities find solidarity in
the collective experiences of these killings. Both the United States and
the EU share a concrete interest in making Iraq and Turkey, respectively,
models for the rest of the Arab world. Americans and Europeans should
make the elimination of honor crimes in these countries a top priority
and even a joint effort. The United States would benefit greatly if
effective strategies used in Turkey could also be applied to Iraq. There is
no question that the Bush Administration wants to see its democracy
project succeed and that women's rights are a core part of this project.
The frequency with which honor crimes continue to occur in Iraq make
claims of the success of women's equality seem like hollow fantasies
rather than accurate characterizations of the state of women's rights in
the country. With so many resources at their disposal and so much to
gain by this goal's achievement, the EU and the United States should
forge a relationship of mutual support in their individual and collective
efforts to fund grassroots movements, which are dominated by women in
a position to understand the problem, that could successfully combat the
prevalence of honor killings in both Turkey and Iraq.
Rebecca E. Boon*

298. Yackley, supra note 253 (quoting Adem's response to Semse Allak's honor killing). Allak
was raped and impregnated and then forced to marry the perpetrator in a southeastern Turkish town.
Upon order by a tribal council, she was subsequently stoned to death. Id.
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